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HOW EMPIRICAL STUDIES CAN AFFECT




Empirical studies concerning the death penalty can play an im-
portant role in public discourse on capital punishment and can affect
our political system's handling of this issue. But constructive dis-
course will occur only if opponents of the death penalty educate
themselves about what the empirical studies show. Abolitionists then
can include these studies in their arsenal along with other arguments
against state-implemented killings. The discussion below exemplifies
how death penalty opponents can use empirical studies to make effec-
tive arguments against capital punishment.
I
DETERRENCE
Death penalty proponents persistently make the argument that
capital punishment deters killing. This argument takes a variety of
forms, none of which withstands analysis.
A. Reputable Studies Fail to Find a Deterrent Effect
Scholars conducting valid studies on the subject of deterrence
have failed to find any deterrent effect from capital punishment.'
This proposition holds true whether one looks just at the states with
the death penalty or whether one compares death penalty states with
non-death penalty states. 2
Yet in the political discourse, the proponents of the death penalty
often claim the contrary-that a deterrent effect exists. They still cite
t BA. 1971, Yale; J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School; Special Counsel, Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; Chair, Death Penalty Committee, American Bar Association
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities; President, New York Lawyers Against the
Death Penalty.
I See, e.g., RAymoND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 218-35 (1991).
2 See, e.g., RonaldJ. Tabak &J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-
Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. LA. L. RPv. 59, 116-17 (1989) (comparing mur-
der rates of several states with an active death penalty to the rate in NewYork, which at the
time did not have the death penalty).
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studies done by Isaac Ehrlich and his student, Stephen Layson.3 Ehr-
lich purported to show that every execution prevents eight homi-
cides.4 Layson went further and claimed that each execution prevents
eighteen homicides. 5 Strangely, Layson "found" most of these "pre-
vented" homicides in years during which no jurisdiction executed any-
one.6 Layson conceded in congressional testimony that he did not
"regard [his] evidence ... as conclusive" and that it would require
many more studies before one could argue that the death penalty de-
ters killing.7
Even though no one has published any study confirming Ehr-
lich's or Layson's findings, many death penalty proponents continue
to rely on their studies.8 To counter this reliance, abolitionists should
point out that the National Academy of Sciences appointed a panel
that strongly discredited Ehrlich's study.9 Additionally, many other
scholars have criticized sharply the work of both Ehrlich 10 and
Layson.11
S See, e.g., Habeas Corpus: Hearings on HR. 3131 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Const.
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 228, 252-55 (1993) (statement of Paul
G. Cassell, Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law); Michael L.
Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1996).
4 See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397, 398 (1975).
5 See Stephen K Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States
Time-Series Evidence, 52 Soc. ECON. J. 68, 80 (1985).
6 Although Layson's study covered 1934-77, he only claimed to have found a deter-
rent effect in the last 15 of those years, but in eight of those years no jurisdiction in the
United States executed anyone. Indeed, Layson testified that if he were to exclude all of
the post-1960 data, the evidence for the deterrent effect of capital punishment "becomes
very weak" or even "nonexistent." Capital Punishment: Hearings on H.R 2837 and H.R. 343
Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 311, 316
(1987) (statement of Stephen Layson, Professor of Economics, University of North Caro-
lina, Greensboro).
7 Id. at 313.
8 See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Death Penalty Is Valid Option, ST. Louis Posr-DsPATCH, Dec.
12, 1994, at 11G.
9 See Lawrence R. Klein et al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment. An Assessment of
the Estimates, in DEERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION 336, 358 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds.,
1978).
10 See, e.g., Brian Forst, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 927, 938-39 (1983) (questioning Ehrlich's claim of deterrence
through capital punishment); Radelet & Akers, supra note 3, at 3 (noting the criticism of
Ehrlich's argument); Gordon P. Waldo, The Death Penalty and Deterrence: A Review of Recent
Research, in THE MAD, THE BAD, AND THE Dx=RuaPr 169, 172-76 (Israel L. Barak-Glantz & C.
Ronald Huff eds., 1981) (cataloging various critiques of Ehrlich's study).
11 See generallyJames Alan Fox & Michael L. Radelet, Persistent Flaws in Econometric Stud-
ies of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 23 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 29 (1989) (inspecting and
criticizing Layson's econometric study as a means of determining whether the death pen-
alty acts as a deterrent).
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B. Anecdotal Assertions of Deterrence Are of Dubious
Credibility and Are Offset by Evidence that the Death
Penalty Sometimes May Lead to Murder
Death penalty supporters often claim that prisoners have stated
that fear of the death penalty had prevented them from committing
murder. These death penalty proponents then argue that capital pun-
ishment has at least deterred those people. The prisoners' statements
in response to these "what if' questions, however, are inherently unre-
liable. In any event, the death penalty, in some cases, has had the
opposite effect and encouraged homicides. For example, few people
know that the notorious Ted Bundy went to Florida to commit his last
murder because Florida had the death penalty and he had a death
wish.12 Moreover, several studies have found that the number of
homicides actually may increase during the period immediately follow-
ing a well-publicized execution.'3
C. Studies Show that Criminologists, Police Chiefs, and Sheriffs
Believe that the Death Penalty Is Not a Significant
Deterrent
Although respected analysts overwhelmingly agree that no solid
proof demonstrates that the death penalty deters homicide, the public
largely still believes that it does.14 Indeed, if the public thought other-
wise, significantly fewer people would support capital punishment.'5
Accordingly, capital punishment opponents should be aware of
studies that undercut the public's belief in deterrence. For example,
the study that Professors Michael L. Radelet and Ronald L. Akers con-
ducted shows that most criminologists do not believe that the death
penalty deters crime.16 Moreover, in 1995, 386 randomly selected po-
12 See DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH
Row 314 (1995); see also Trisha Renaud, Wat He Wanted: Sentence Is Death, NAT'L LJ., Oct.
26, 1998, at A8 (discussing the death sentence of Daniel M. Colwell, a mentally ill defen-
dant who committed murder because he wanted the death penalty and then threatened
jurors should they fail to impose it).
13 See, e.g., Thorsten Sellin, The Death Penalty: A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of
the American Law Institute, in MODEL PENAL CODE 220 post, 65-69 (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1959) (study conducted for the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code Project); Wil-
liam C. Bailey, Disaggregation in Deterrence and Death Penalty Research: The Case of Murder in
Chicago, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 855-58 (1983); William J. Bowers & Glenn L.
Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DEUNQ. 453,
471-83 (1980).
14 See Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting
Persona4 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1453-54 (1998).
15 See Radelet & Akers, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that in a Gallup public opinion poll
76% of respondents initially supported the death penalty, but only 52% continued their
support when asked to hypothesize that capital punishment does not deter murder).
16 See id. at 5-14 (reporting in part that only 4.5% of surveyed experts believe that the
death penalty has been a stronger deterrent than long prison sentences).
1998] 1433
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lice chiefs and county sheriffs throughout the country ranked the
death penalty last among seven potential ways to reduce crime.17
Rather, they responded by a 67% to 26% margin that they do not
believe that the death penalty significantly lowers the number of
killings.18
D. The Death Penalty Is Not Needed to Prevent People Who
Have Committed Capital Murder from Killing Again
Some death penalty proponents make a somewhat different argu-
ment, asserting that even if the death penalty does not deter people
who never before have committed murder, it surely prevents those
already imprisoned for capital murder from killing again. This argu-
ment-although perhaps reasonable in theory-disregards empirical
evidence about the behavior of prisoners who have committed capital
murder. Do they kill again? The evidence shows that virtually all of
them do not kill again. A study that Professors Marquart and Sorensen
conducted of all 558 inmates in thirty states whom the Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia'9 had saved from execution
bears this out.20 It shows that in the following fifteen years, none of
them killed a prison guard in twenty-nine of the thirty states, and only
seven committed a homicide against anyone-four against fellow pris-
oners, one against an ex-girlfriend, and two against Ohio prison
guards.2I Meanwhile, by the time Marquart and Sorensen published
their study, attorneys had shown that at least four people whom
Furman saved from execution were innocent of the crimes for which
they had been sentenced to death.22 As Professor Marquart said, "'We
would have executed nearly 600 convicts to protect us from [seven].
And we would have killed four innocent people in the process."' 23
Professors Marquart and Sorensen conducted a separate study with
Professor Ekland-Olson that focused on ninety-two inmates whom
courts had sentenced to death after Furman only to have their
sentences later changed to life imprisonment.24 They found that only
one of the inmates committed a murder (and that was committed in
17 See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CGR., ON THE FRONT LINE: LAW EN-
FORCEMENT VIEWS ON THE DEATH PENALTIY 4, 5 fig.1 (1995).
18 See id. at 9, 10 tbl.4.
19 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20 See James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-
Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 5,
22-24 (1989).
21 See id. at 19-21, 24-25, 27.
22 See id. at 25.
23 Andrew H. Malcolm, Society's Conflict on Death Penalty Stalls Procession of the Con-
demned, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1989, at B10 (quoting Professor Marquart).
24 SeeJames W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict
Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & Soc' REv. 449, 460 (1989).
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prison), and that these inmates were generally less violent than other
prisoners. 25 These facts are inconsistent with what capital punishment
proponents would have the public believe.
Many death penalty opponents, however, say capital punishment
is needed to prevent killings by prisoners released on parole. This
argument is erroneous. Almost all parolee killings that death penalty
proponents cite involve parolees whom capital punishment could not
possibly have prevented from killing because they had not committed
capital crimes.26 (Indeed, many were not previously convicted of any
degree of homicide. 27) Moreover, the parole of and subsequent kill-
ings by these prisoners and those few others who were previously con-
victed of capital murder has nothing to do with the most common
alternative to the death penalty for those convicted of capital crimes:
life without possibility of parole. The state cannot release those serv-
ing this sentence absent an extremely rare grant of clemency.
Although states did release on parole some capital murderers and
others whom capital punishment supporters cite when making their
argument, these releases occurred under life (or term of years) with
possibility of parole laws. 28 Yet most states now have replaced those
laws with life without parole laws, at least for capital crimes.
Thus, while the ill-fated paroles cited by death penalty supporters
are upsetting, they are being used to reach a baseless conclusion.
Death penalty opponents should use particular well-publicized exam-
ples of parolees who kill to show how the death penalty is irrelevant in
considering how to prevent prisoners from being paroled and then
committing murder.29 They should also cite the empirical evidence
discussed above concerning the subsequent histories of people who
not only committed capital murder, but also were sentenced to death.
Perhaps most importantly, abolitionists need to inform the public
that the sentence of life without possibility of parole exists as an alter-
native to the death penalty in most jurisdictions. And abolitionists
must impress upon the public that this sentence really means life with-
out possibility of parole. As Professor Gross states in his Symposium
article, most people and most jurors do not believe that life without
25 See id. at 460-62.
26 Several anecdotal examples are cited in Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 120-23.
27 See, e.g., id. at 120-21 (discussing California's Lawrence Singleton, whose prior con-
viction was for rape and attempted murder, not any degree of homicide).
28 For example, it was parole under life with possibility of parole systems, and not
either life without parole or clemency, that occurred in the Smith case, see infra note 29,
and in the examples discussed by Tabak and Lane, supra note 2, at 120-23.
29 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing California's Jimmy Lee Smith,
who murdered a Los Angeles policeman the same year that he was paroled from prison,
but whose prior convictions concerned theft and drugs, not any degree of homicide).
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parole really exists 30 Yet it does exist in most jurisdictions.3' More-
over, the states in which it does exist, such as Michigan (which does
not have the death penalty), do not release capital murderers serving
this sentence.3 2
Abolitionists also should note in political discourse that in New
York, Republicans fought against the enactment of a life-without-pa-
role sentence either instead of enacting the death penalty or as a part
of the death penalty statute. When Mario Cuomo was governor, the
Republicans refused to enact a life-without-parole sentence because,
as they publicly conceded, they knew that allowing such a sentence
would weaken death penalty support.33 In other words, they wanted
to bolster the phony argument that the choice was between enacting
the death penalty, which Cuomo was preventing, and letting the state
parole convicts who would commit more murders. When New York
elected George Pataki as governor, it became clear that New York
would adopt the death penalty. Still, his former colleagues in the Re-
publican-controlled State Senate opposed the inclusion of life without
parole as an alternative.3 4 The legislature ultimately included it at the
insistence of Assembly Democrats.
E. Recent Murder-Rate Drops in Such States as New York and
Texas Do Not Provide Legitimate Support to the
Deterrence Argument
As yet another deterrence argument, death penalty supporters
currently point to the declining murder rates in both Texas, which
executes a tremendous number of people, and New York, which en-
acted the death penalty in 1995. Indeed, Governor Pataki has as-
serted that the enactment of the death penalty explains why the
murder rate in New York is declining so rapidly.35
30 See Gross, supra note 14, at 1459-62; see also RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., SENTENCING FOR LIFE: AMERICANS EMBRACE ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PEN-
Aury 8 (1993) ("Most Americans are poorly informed about the likely sentences which
capital murderers would receive if not given the death penalty.").
31 See DIETER, supra note 30, at 8, 11 fig.4.
32 See Diane Katz, In Mich., Life Without Parole, NEWSDAY, June 20, 1989, at 5 ("'After a
few years, lifers become your better prisoners. They tend to adjust and just do their time.
They tend to be a calming influence on the younger kids, and we have more problems with
people serving short terms'" (quoting Michigan Department of Corrections official Leo
Lalonde)).
33 See Elizabeth Kolbert, As Vote on Death Penalty Nears, Cuomo Advocates Life Sentences,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1989, at B1O.
34 The first death penalty legislation to be introduced that year in the Republican-
controlled New York State Senate did not include life without parole as a sentencing alter-
native. SeeJames Dao, Delay in Albany on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at Al.
35 See Clyde Haberman, Golden Oldie from Pataki: Death Ditty, N.Y. TIMES,June 16, 1998,
at B1.
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Death penalty opponents, and anyone else with a modest regard
for the truth, should respond that the declining Texas murder rate
mirrors a national trend that includes many states without either the
death penalty or Texas's blistering pace of executions. As for New
York, the large drop in the murder rate began several years before it
enacted the death penalty. Indeed, in New York City, where approxi-
mately 80% of the state's murders occur,3 6 the murder rate dropped
so sharply in the first half of 1995-before September 1995, when the
death penalty law took effect-that on July 8 the New York Times's
front-page headline read, Murder Rate Plunges in New York City: A 25-
Year Low in First Half This Year.37 In Manhattan, where District Attor-
ney Morgenthau has never sought the death penalty, the murder rate
now has reached its lowest level since the early-1950s.
Governor Pataki's argument that a death penalty statute, under
which no one had been sentenced to death until June 1998, has some-
how greatly lowered the murder rate is ludicrous. If his argument
were true, then why has Philadelphia, which has sent over 100 people
to death row, not also had its murder rate plunge rather than remain
at its high level?38 Indeed, his claim is at odds with Reverend Pat Rob-
ertson's argument that the death penalty does not deter now but
would deter if only states would carry it out more quickly.39 In re-
sponding to those who argue that speedy executions would lead to
deterrence, capital punishment opponents should point out thatjuris-
dictions in this country during the pre-Furman era executed people
much more quickly than they do now; yet the reputable scholarly stud-
ies have failed to find a deterrent effect during that time.40
F. The Burden of Proof on the Deterrence Argument Should
Rest on the Shoulders of Supporters, Not Opponents, of
the Death Penalty
During the March 1995 debate in the New York State Assembly,
which immediately preceded the enactment of the death penalty law,
the legislation's Assembly sponsor, Eric Vataliano, stated that while
36 See James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's
Death Penalty Legislation, 17 PACE L. REv. 41, 89-90 & n.187 (1996) (citing N.Y. STATE DIV. OF
CmM. JUSTICE SERVS., 1994 CRIME AND JuSTIcE ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1995)).
37 Clifford Krauss, Murder Rate Plunges in New York City: A 25-Year Low in First Half This
Year, N.Y. TimEs, July 8, 1995, at Al.
38 See Haberman, supra note 35.
39 Robertson, in opposing Texas's execution of Karla Faye Tucker, said that he would
not have opposed her execution if Texas had carried it out many years earlier because back
then, it would have deterred killings, and she had not yet shown remorse and become a
pious person. See 60 Minutes: Inmate 777: Woman on Death Row Gets Support from Christian
Community (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 7, 1997) (transcript available in LEXIS, News
Library, Script File).
40 See sources cited supra notes 1, 10.
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the death penalty might or might not deter, the burden of proof on
deterrence rests with those who oppose the death penalty.4' Thus, he
thundered, if the evidence regarding deterrence is inconclusive, New
York should have the death penalty because it might deter.42
In response, death penalty opponents should set forth reasons
why the burden of proof must rest with supporters of the death penalty.
First, the state takes lives with the death penalty. Thus, if supporters
cannot show that it deters killing, the state surely should not take
those lives. Indeed, the lack of demonstrable deterrence has com-
pelled the Roman Catholic Church to favor, as a practical matter, the
abolition of the death penalty.43
Second, the death penalty brings with it the danger of executing
innocent people. As Professors Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam have
shown, this country has a long history of sentencing to death, and
sometimes executing, innocent people.44 In a growing number of
cases, the state has averted executing innocent people only because of
a variety of completely fortuitous circumstances. 45
Third, jurisdictions in the United States carry out the death pen-
alty in a systemically unjust fashion. These systemic problems-in-
cluding the lack of qualified and properly performing counsel,46 the
curtailment of habeas corpus as a means to rectify due process viola-
tions,47 the pattern of racial discrimination in implementing capital
punishment,48 and the execution of both mentally retarded people
andjuveniles49-prompted the American Bar Association ("ABA") last
year to call for a moratorium on executions in this country.50 Thus,
41 See The Assembly, State of New York, Record of Proceedings, Mar. 6, 1995, at 8-10.
42 See id.
43 See Panel Discussion, Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus, 27 Loy. U. CHI. LJ.
523, 612-13 (1996) (remarks of Rev. Michael Place) [hereinafter Habeas Panel] (discussing
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYcuCAL LETTER, EVANGELIUM VITAE, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: ON THE VALUE
AND INVIoLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE (1995)).
44 See generally MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CoNVIC-
TIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992) (cataloging past and contemporary examples of cases in
which the state prosecuted, convicted, or executed innocent people).
45 See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY- THE INCREASING DANGER OF EXECUTING THE INNOCENT 24-26 (1997).
46 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 69-75.
47 See infra Part III.B.1.
48 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1638 (1998).
49 See generally Gross, supra note 14, at 1466-67 (discussing the discontinuity in public
opinion concerning whether the death penalty should be applied to youths and the men-
tally retarded).
50 Resolution 107, A.B.A. House of Delegates (Feb. 3, 1997) reprinted in Randall Coyne
& Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar Association's Recommen-
dations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on Executions,
4 GEo. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 49 (1996).
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the largest organization of American lawyers, based on its considera-
ble expertise regarding the functioning of the American death pen-
alty system, has said that the system is so unfair that executions must
be halted until we correct all of these pervasive problems. Professors
Randall Coyne and Lyn Entzeroth, the authors of the leading
casebook on capital punishment, have set forth extensively the bases
for the ABA resolution.51 United Nations Special Rapporteur Bacre
Waly Ndiaye, an independent expert whom the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights appointed to study the United States capital
punishment system, echoed the ABA's conclusions and call for a mor-
atorium in an extensive report released publicly in April 1998.52
II
COST
Many death penalty supporters justify their support for capital
punishment by arguing that they do not want to spend money on im-
prisoning people convicted of capital murder. In response to this ar-
gument, death penalty opponents should point out that all serious
studies on this point have found that the death penalty system costs
considerably more than a non-death penalty system. Duke Univer-
sity's Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy completed one of the
most comprehensive of these studies in 1993. 53 It concluded, after
two years of analysis, that in North Carolina death penalty cases cost at
least $2.16 million more per execution than life without parole. 54 The
Death Penalty Information Center report, aptly titled Millions Miss-
pent: What Politicians Don't Say About the High Costs of the Death Penalty,55
summarized the Cook and Swanson study and numerous other studies
reaching similar conclusions. 56
To be effective, capital punishment opponents must look beyond
the bottom line that these studies reveal. They also must know that
postconviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings are not the ma-
jor reasons that the death penalty system is more expensive than the
alternative; and that even if jurisdictions completely abolished these
proceedings, the death penalty system still would be more expensive
51 See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 50.
52 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicia; Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1998/68/Add.3 (1998); Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for 'Racist' Use of Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at A17.
53 See PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES
IN NORTH CAROLINA (1993).
54 See id. at 98.
55 RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., MILLIONS MISSPENT. WHAT POLrrI-
CIANS DON'T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (rev. ed. 1994).
56 See id. passim.
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than the alternative. The greatest expenses associated with capital
punishment arise from the following: a considerably higher percent-
age of cases go to trial when prosecutors seek the death penalty than
when they do not; and death penalty trials require both more intense
pretrial preparation and more elaborate, two-phased trial proceed-
ings.57 Moreover, a high percentage of the cases in which prosecutors
seek the death penalty, after incurring all these extra expenses, result
in sentences other than death-either as the outcome of the original
trial or as the result of other courts subsequently granting relief be-
cause of harmful constitutional error, an unusually common occur-
rence in capital trials.58
If death penalty opponents are unaware of the actual reasons why
the death penalty system is more expensive than the alternative, they
unintentionally may support the arguments of those who want to evis-
cerate habeas corpus (and are having considerable success towards
that end). This risk should not prevent death penalty opponents from
making the cost argument. Rather, they must emphasize the major
reasons why the death penalty system is more expensive and stress that




A. The Vengeance Argument Has Become Respectable
In the pre-Furman era, few people in respectable circles advanced
vengeance as an argument for the death penalty.59 Today however,
many death penalty proponents concede that the traditional argu-
ments for the death penalty are not persuasive, but they then assert
that vengeance justifies the death penalty.60 They argue that some
criminals deserve the death penalty so society can show its most ex-
57 See id. at 19-21.
58 See id. at 19-22; see also Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 133-35 (articulating several
reasons why the death penalty increases state expenditures). The extra cost of the death
penalty is not due to the expense of litigating frivolous appeals, as the proponents assert.
To the extent that defendants win appeals, the additional cost is obviously not due to
frivolous appeals. Moreover, it is not due to the costliness of litigating meritorious appeals.
Rather, the additional costs flow from the added expense of the original trial and also from
the expense of either relitigating the trial or obtaining a life sentence that likely could have
been reached without all of the added costs. The high rate of reversal is due, in larger
part, to prosecutors and judges succumbing to the political pressures to sentence defend-
ants to death once prosecutors have chosen to seek the death penalty. See id. at 133-34.
59 See The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., A Symposium on the Death Penalty, 23
HoFsrRA L. Rxv. 627, 630 (1995) (remarks of Norman Redlich).
60 Death penalty proponents do not always use the word "vengeance," but their argu-
ment amounts to one for vengeance when they advocate the death penalty because the
defendant "deserves" it or because it is supposedly necessary to honor the victim's memory.
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treme disapproval of their crimes and supposedly provide some solace
to the victim's survivors. Some death penalty proponents who make
this argument do not insist on the death penalty if the person facing
execution shows remorse, while others insist on executions notwith-
standing remorse. Many death penalty supporters opposed Texas's
early-1998 execution of Karla Faye Tucker, highlighting this partial
divergence of views.
B. Empirical Evidence of Unfairness Counters the Call for
Vengeance
In response to vengeance arguments, abolitionists must under-
stand the moral arguments against vengeance and the true back-
ground of Biblical passages such as "An eye for an eye and a tooth for
a tooth," which, when properly understood, do notjustify capital pun-
ishment.61  Death penalty proponents, however, often seek to
marginalize their opponents by disagreeing on the traditional moral
arguments and ignoring other responsible bases for opposing the
death penalty.
This makes it particularly important for death penalty opponents
to know about empirical evidence showing many grossly unfair re-
spects in which the death penalty system operates. Indeed, executions
are for that reason alone immoral. As noted earlier, Coyne and
Entzeroth summarize much of the empirical evidence in their article
outlining the bases for the ABA's call for a moratorium on execu-
tions.62 The following discussion touches on empirical evidence con-
ceming three grossly unfair aspects of the death penalty.
1. Habeas Corpus and Clemency
Professor James Liebman has done detailed studies showing that
in habeas cases decided between 1976 and 1991, 47% of death row
inmates who had lost in all state court proceedings obtained relief in
federal habeas corpus.63 This statistic is very important, but oppo-
nents of habeas corpus often prevail in the public discourse because
habeas corpus's supporters fail to explain what it is and why it is im-
portant. Accordingly, some supporters belatedly have begun to high-
light examples of cases in which death row inmates have obtained
relief only through habeas corpus. Two compelling examples warrant
discussion. The Supreme Court affirmed habeas relief for my client,
Raymond Franklin, because the jury charge shifted the burden of
proof to him on the crucial issue, and the judge's mistake was not
61 See Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 142-46.
62 See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 50, at 35-37.
63 See 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACrnCE AND PRO-
CEDURE 17 & n.21 (2d ed. 1994).
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harmless error.64 The Court also granted Tony Amadeo habeas re-
lief65 after "an independent civil action in federal court brought to
light a scheme" in which the district attorney surreptitiously had the
jury commissioner discriminate against African Americans. 66 The dis-
trict attorney did this by constructing a jury venire that was racially
imbalanced by an amount just under the level likely to attract scru-
tiny.67 Without seeing a lengthy list of such examples, 68 otherwise so-
phisticated lawyers-not to mention nonlawyers-often fail to realize
the fundamental nature of the Bill of Rights violations that lead to
habeas corpus relief.
Unless people know about both the realities of habeas corpus and
Professor Liebman's empirical data, habeas corpus opponents will suc-
ceed with their erroneous claims that defendants who have secured
relief in habeas corpus have won merely on "technicalities" and that
habeas corpus "reform" is merely an effort to prevent frivolous delay
tactics. If habeas corpus reform really were aimed at stemming frivo-
lous arguments, I, for one, would not object to it. Underneath the
veneer of its proponents' reasonable-sounding verbiage, however, this
reform actually is aimed at preventing relief for death row inmates
with meritorious arguments. That is, habeas corpus reform principally
aims to preclude a person, whose constitutional rights the state has
violated in a way that very possibly has affected the trial's outcome,
from securing a federal court ruling on his meritorious constitutional
claims. Because the supporters of habeas corpus largely have failed to
expose this aim effectively, Congress enacted habeas corpus reform in
1996 as part of the misleadingly named Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.69
Many death penalty supporters and habeas corpus opponents
join Paul Kamenar of the Washington Legal Foundation in arguing
that our legal system now provides "super due process" and thereby
eliminates unfairness problems in the death penalty's implementa-
tion.70 Yet even before Congress "reformed" habeas corpus, there
were numerous examples to the contrary. These examples include
cases in which the state executed people because their lawyers negli-
gently had failed to object to a serious constitutional violation on
64 See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1985).
65 See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 228-29 (1988).
66 Id. at 217.
67 See id. at 217-18.
68 See, e.g., Habeas Pane4 supra note 43, at 526-29 (commentary by Ronald J. Tabak).
69 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
70 Conference, The Death Penalty in the Tweny-First Centuy, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 239, 340
(1995) [hereinafter Death Penalty Conference] (remarks of Paul Kamenar, Washington Legal
Foundation).
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which others had obtained relief or because the Supreme Court has
erected various other procedural "booby traps" for capital defend-
ants. 71 Supporters of habeas corpus need to know about and discuss
these examples. The "booby traps" are the real technicalities, not the
meritorious constitutional claims that the "booby traps" and habeas
corpus reform prevent the federal courts from reaching. Empirical
studies aboutjurors' misunderstandings ofjury charges are important
in explaining (1) the importance of habeas corpus, because courts
have sometimes granted habeas corpus relief due to misleading jury
charges; and (2) why clemency is needed, because the severe new limi-
tations on habeas corpus may prevent relief in situations that, due to
misleading jury charges, would have led to habeas relief in the past.
Opponents of granting clemency often argue that the state has
no reason to consider granting clemency because the defendant had
both a jury that considered everything and super due process
throughout the proceedings. Yet several empirical studies have shown
that jurors have problems understanding legal instructions that are
vital to a fair determination in a capital case.72 For example, one em-
pirical study conducted by Professors Bowers and Steiner shows that
jurors often do not believe or follow instructions stating that life with-
out parole is an alternative to the death penalty.73 This study indi-
cates that jurors are rejecting life without parole in favor of capital
punishment because they erroneously believe that life without parole
really means life with parole. If this study is accurate, then states are
sending people to death row and, in the absence of clemency, execut-
ing them because jurors are unable or unwilling to follow the judge's
charge.74 These studies therefore demonstrate that we need not only
habeas corpus but also meaningful clemency proceedings.
2. Racial Discrimination in Implementing the Death Penalty
Many people believe the current implementation of the death
penalty is racially discriminatory; others, however, believe that discrim-
ination only happened in the old days or, if it does exist today, that it
occurs only in the South. This reality is why the work of Professors
Baldus and others,7 5 which demonstrates racial discrimination in Phil-
71 See Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as a Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A
Tribute Which May Also Be a Eulogy, 26 SErON HALL L. REv. 1477, 1483-89 (1996).
72 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions
in Capital Cases, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 9-12 (1993) (presenting data that indicate capital
jurors often do not properly understand the judge's standard-of-proof instructions).
73 See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by False Choice and Forced
Choice: Empirical Evidence of Misguided Discretion in Capital Sentencing 65-90 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
74 See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 72, at 12; Bowers & Steiner, supra note 73, at 91-
96.
75 See Baldus et al., supra note 48.
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adelphia, is particularly important. It shows that even in a large
Northern "City of Brotherly Love," a pattern of racial discrimination,
by both the race of the defendant and the race of the victim, exists in
the implementation of the death penalty.
It is important that those fighting racial discrimination in the
death penalty system rely on solid, statistically proper studies (such as
the Baldus study) and not on raw data. Often, opponents of the death
penalty make the following type of argument: because African Ameri-
cans are "x" percent of the population, but constitute a much higher
percentage of those on death row, jurisdictions must be discriminat-
ing when imposing the death penalty. Death penalty proponents eas-
ily knock down this type of argument. Opponents of the death
penalty-and others who may not oppose the death penalty but want
to pass legislation like the Racial Justice Act 76 in an effort to reduce
racial discrimination in capital sentencing77 -must know the more so-
phisticated facts.
Opponents of the death penalty's racism also need to know how
to respond to attacks on another Baldus study, which analyzed racial
discrimination in Georgia's implementation of the death penalty,78 as
well as studies that others have done. Critics such as Kamenar assert
that Baldus did not take into account the kind of crime involved, but
Baldus did take this into account.79 Those trying to combat racial dis-
crimination in our capital punishment system need to know that the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") has found Baldus's Georgia study
(and many other studies by experts like Professors Gross and Bowers)
valid.80 Moreover, the GAO found major problems with some studies
that reached opposite conclusions.8' In particular, the GAO found
that a Rand study on the death penalty in California, which death pen-
alty supporters often cite, had a conclusion that was "not supported by
76 S. 1696, 101st Cong. (1989).
77 For a description of a version of the Racial Justice Act that, under another name,
Congress considered, see Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sen-
tencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777, 789-98 (1990-1991). On March 30, 1998,
the Kentucky legislature passed and sent to the governor for signature the Kentucky Racial
Justice Act, a somewhat watered-down version of the legislation described in Tabak, supra.
See Tom Loftus, Bill to Fight Racial Bias in Capital Cases Passes, LouisvILLE CouRIER-JouRNAL,
Mar. 31, 1998, at Bi.
78 See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JuSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY. A LEGAL AND
EMPIRIcAL ANALYsIs (1990).
79 See, e.g., Death Penalty Conference, supra note 70, at 318-19 (remarks ofJamin Raskin,
Associate Dean, The American University, Washington College of Law) (describing the
Baldus methodology); id. at 341 (remarks of Harriet C. Ganson, Assistant Director, GAO)
(responding to erroneous statements by Paul Kamenar).
80 See Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 50, at 37, 66 n.326.
81 See Death Penalty Conference, supra note 70, at 320-23, 341 (discussing U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO SENATE AND HousE COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PEN-
ALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATRN OF RACIAL DIsPARTES (1990)).
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the data."8 2 Indeed, while the Rand study concludes that no racially
discriminatory effect exists, the data from the largest analysis that
Rand has performed shows a significant "race of victim" effect, mean-
ing that it is "highly unlikely that [this discrimination] was tru[ly] due
to chance."83
Opponents of the Racial Justice Act sometimes argue that Con-
gress and legislatures should not enact it because it would require
abolishing the death penalty. In other words, these opponents say
that we cannot have a death penalty system that does not systemically
discriminate by race. In response, the Racial Justice Act's supporters
should note that jurisdictions could take various steps to deal effec-
tively with racial discrimination in our death penalty system.8 4 In the
political discourse, death penalty opponents also should respond by
asking, "Do we have to tolerate racial discrimination as a price of hav-
ing the death penalty?" This question goes to the morality of the
death penalty in the United States.
Moreover, advocates of the RacialJustice Act have to make a con-
nection between the empirical data and particular cases that illustrate
racism in death penalty implementation. One example is the case of
William Hance: a relatively rare capital case in which an African Amer-
ican defendant in Columbus, Georgia did not face an all-white jury.
Instead, one African American sat on the jury. Under Georgia law, if
even one juror votes for a life sentence, as the lone African American
juror in fact did, the defendant is supposed to receive a life sen-
tence.8 5 In reporting on the jury's vote, however, the foreman lied
and said that the jury had voted unanimously for death. When the
judge polled the jury, the African American juror was afraid to contra-
dict the foreman. Later, shortly before Hance's scheduled execution,
the juror revealed these uncontradicted facts, which other jurors con-
firmed, and also that jury members had engaged in racial discus-
sions.8 6 Hance's counsel tried to secure relief based on these
revelations.8 7 But no court would grant Hance relief, and the state
denied clemency. So Georgia executed him.88
82 Id. at 341 (referring to the Rand study as the Klein study, as it is also known).
83 Id.
84 See Tabak, supra note 77, at 789-97 (illustrating that both courts and legislatures
could greatly ameliorate the racial discrimination in implementing the death penalty).
85 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31.1(c) (1997); State v. Ingram, 467 S.E.2d 523, 525 n.8
(Ga. 1996); Hill v. State, 301 S.E.2d 269, 270 (Ga. 1983); Miller v. State, 229 S.E.2d 376,
377-78 (Ga. 1976).
86 See Bob Herbert, Mr. Hance's Perfect Punishment,'N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1994, at 17.
87 See Bob Herbert, Jury Room Injustice, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 30, 1994, at A15.
88 See Peter Applebome, Georgia Executes Murderer After Brief Stay from Cour, N.Y. TimEs,
Apr. 1, 1994, at Al.
1998] 1445
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
3. The Real Risk of Executing Innocent People
When people raise in political discourse the subject of innocent
people being executed, death penalty supporters like to retort quickly
that no one has cited any recent case in which a court has ruled un-
equivocally that the executed person was innocent. To deal with this
argument, death penalty opponents should point out that once the
state has executed someone, it is highly unlikely that any court will
definitely opine on the person's innocence, even though very strong
evidence of innocence might exist. An example is the case of Roger
Coleman, which is the subject of John Tucker's recent book, May God
Have Mercy.89 As I discuss in my review of this book, Tucker's full ac-
count of the facts surrounding this case and its subsequent appeals
strongly indicates that it is more likely than not that Coleman, whom
Virginia executed, was innocent.90
When Florida executed Jesse Tafero in 1990,91 it attracted atten-
tion only because the electric chair, "Old Sparky," malfunctioned. 92
But now there are significant reasons to believe that he was innocent
of the capital murder for which Florida executed him. The attorney
for SoniaJacobs, Tafero's codefendant and girlfriend, developed facts
in the years following Tafero's execution that have led many to beliece
that both Tafero and Jacobs were probably innocent.93 In 1992 the
Eleventh Circuit vacated Jacobs's conviction because crucial prosecu-
tion witnesses had lacked credibility and the state had withheld impor-
tant evidence from the defense. 94 Later that year, Florida released
Jacobs after she agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder and
kidnapping, an agreement that was a condition of her release, and
Florida permitted her to continue to assert her innocence. 95
Death penalty proponents also argue that because so many death
row inmates ultimately have been exonerated and released, the system
works. In reality, these situations do not show that the system works.
By looking closely at those cases, one learns that fortuities were the
sole reasons that states spared most of these people.96 For example,
happenstance led to Federico Martinez-Macias's becoming the first
89 JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
(1997).
90 See Ronald J. Tabak, Death Penalty Be Not Proud: Examining the Legal Missteps in a
Notorious Case, A.B.A. J.,Jan. 1998, at 80 (reviewingJOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY.
A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1997)).
91 See Killer of 2 Police Officers Executed in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1990, at 26.
92 See Electric-Chair Dispute Brings Another Stay, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at 19.
93 See 20/20: Crossing Paths Again (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 27, 1992) (transcript
available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File).
94 SeeJacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 1992).
95 See Peter Marks, 'I'm Free, I'm Free, I'm Free!. Serving Life in Murders, She's Released-
With Friend's Aid, NEWSDAY, OCL 13, 1992, at 5.
96 See DIETER, supra note 45, at 24-26.
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pro bono, postconviction, death row inmate whom the Washington
office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP represented. No
one expected when the firm was asked to handle the case that, after
expending huge amounts of time and resources, it would be able to
prove to the federal courts that Texas should never have convicted
him.97 Skadden, Arps presented evidence that persuaded the grand
jury not even to reindict Martinez-Macias, resulting in his release. 98
This high-quality state postconviction, federal habeas corpus, and
grand jury representation is rarely available to death row inmates.
Moreover, states inevitably will execute more innocent people as
they (along with Congress) impose statutes of limitations in capital
proceedings, and as they (along with the courts) take other steps to
curtail the availability of habeas corpus. This conclusion is obvious
from looking at the circumstances under which people on death row
have been exonerated in recent years. In many of these cases, their
lives were saved only because counsel had several years in which to
develop the true facts or because witnesses finally came forward.99
CONCLUSION
Before politicians will change how they approach the death pen-
alty, renowned scholars must take the necessary first step and under-
take the kinds of empirical studies that constitute the subject of this
Symposium. In addition, death penalty opponents must learn about
these empirical studies and synthesize them with real-life, anecdotal
examples and moral arguments to develop persuasive, coherent argu-
ments.100 Only then will we have a real chance to abolish the death
penalty in this country.
97 See Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming
the judgment of the district court that Texas denied the defendant adequate assistance of
counsel and ordering his release), afg 810 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
98 See Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1105, 1113-14 (1994) (remarks of RonaldJ. Tabak).
99 See generally DIETER, supra note 45, at 24-25 (describing numerous cases in which
capital case convictions have been overturned due to a variety of circumstances).
100 See, e.g., RudolphJ. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth I4 LrG., Spring 1998, at 3 (explain-
ing in detail why after 25 years as a lawyer and judge, now on the Arizona State Court of
Appeals, he has changed from a proponent to an opponent of the death penalty).
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